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Abstract
The end of the Cold War has influenced conditions of nuclear non-proliferation. While
the chance of a total nuclear war has been reduced, new concerns such as new types of
nuclear proliferation are currently being identified. Primarily these concerns are focused
on the　emergence of the states which have plans to develop nuclear weapons secretly, and
the proliferation of weapon-usable materials released from disassembled warheads. The
authors propose new roles ofthe IAEA to achieve this requirement. As for strengthened
safeguards for detection of undeclared nuclear activities, the establishment of a new
method for confirmation of the end location of equipment as well as its end use are pro-
posed. To increase the transparency of nuclear activities of the Member States, several
actions are proposed. In new fields such as verification of nuclear materials from　the
START process and for a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, the IAEA should establish
practical systems and measures. The technical issues related to the new verification ac-
tivities are discussed. The integrated verification system combining the proliferation ori-
ented approach with the current safeguards approach is suggested. Finally, the authors
concludethat the roles and functions of the IAEA should be improved in accordance with
the expectation from the international community.
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1. Basic Understandings of Nuclear Non-Proliferation after the Cold War
The Cold War is over. The arms buildup, particularly the nuclear arms race,
has been halted and partly reversed. After the Summit m Reykjavik, d芭tente be-
tween the U.S. and the USSR became more advanced, and at the Malta Summit
the end of the Cold War was confirmed between the superpowers. Through these
discussions, nuclear disarmament has actually progressed in both States, and the
chance of a total nuclear war has been significantly reduced in the world.
Following the disruption of the USSR, states within the USSR have become in-
dependent, and血rough their search for economic improvement, they have many
chances to contact western states. It is recognized that the threat to world peace
by nuclear weapons was reduced, because of an increase in communications be-
tween the camps of the East and the West.
The bipolarized political structure has been terminated, and the age of multipo-
larized world politics has come. For example, the integration of the European Un-
ion (EU) has been strengthened, and也e cooperation of ASEAN has increased.
Former U.S. president George Bush proposed to establish a New World Order, but
at this stage, it is difficult to foresee such an order for us. The decrease in the
influence of the superpowers has led to regional or small conflicts which may be
occasion to seek the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, due to the end of the Cold War, nuclear disarmament has
progressed and nuclear weapons which no longer have strategic purposes have
been disassembled. Elimination of nuclear weapons has been welcomed in the inter-
national community, but the disassembling of nuclear weapons has brought a new
source of anxiety. This comes from the uncertainty of the control system for the
dismantled nuclear weapons. The world faces new issues though it has been re-
leased from the fear of a total nuclear war.
2. Possible Nuclear Proliferation Scenarios
Two types of nuclear proliferation scenarios can be identified as follows:
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(1) Proliferation from Civil Use
Current safeguards measures are based mainly on material accountancy, with
containment and surveillance as complementary measures, for the purpose of veri-
fying that仇ere is no diversion of nuclear materials from civil use. This concept
depends upon the understanding that if nuclear material is confirmed under the ap-
propriate quantitative control, we can conclude that the material will not be used
for unknown purposes. According to these measures, verification efforts will in-
crease in proportion to the nuclear material flows and inventories. It is true that
from views of the exact material control for nuclear safety and nuclear fuel man-
agement, certain material accountancy is needed. But from the view of nuclear
non-proliferation, additional activities which could prevent nuclear proliferation
should be introduced. A uranium enrichment facility and a plutonium recovery fa-
cility such as a reprocessing plant are the most critical elements related to di-
rectly producing a nuclear weapon. The states which have plans to develop nu-
clear weapons secretly may intend to construct such facilities under undeclared
conditions. Iraqi and DPRK's doubts could come into this category. Therefore, the
international community has considered that the confirmation of the non-existence
of undeclared facilities is essential. If the Member States have the facilities for a
peaceful purpose, they should accept the verification activities to detect misuse of
these facilities.
(2) Proliferation of Nuclear Material released from Military Use
The U.S. and Russia agreed that the nuclear weapons no longer needed for
global security should be disassembled. According to the START Treaties, both
States accepted mutual inspection to verify the disassembling of missiles. As for
the control of weapon-usable material released from the disassembled warheads,
the U.S. and Russia agreed to introduce an additional verification regime to be ap-
plied to such material by the IAEA. Both States and the IAEA are now discussing
the establishment of practical procedures to verify weapon-usable nuclear materials.
Such direction can be approved by the international community.
However, the control regime to be applied to the warheads or the pits has not
been clearly stated by either party. The international community is especially
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anxious that warheads from tactical nuclear weapons would have a high possibility
of proliferating to countries which hold internal or regional conflicts.
Recently, some newspapers have reported events connected with the illicit traf-
hcking of small amounts of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.
Up to now, we have not encountered events related to the illicit trafficking of
large amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material or nuclear weapons, but there is
no doubt that these reports give some fear to the international community that not
only such nuclear material but also也e nuclear weapons themselves may prolifer-
ate beyond public awareness.
3. The Approach against Nuclear Proliferation
(1) Strengthening Safeguards to be applied to Peaceful Use Materials
The IAEA should give priority to safeguards to be applied to血e peaceful use
materials with consideration for the proliferation paths. As for nuclear materials,
HEU and Pu are the most important materials directly connected to nuclear weap-
ons. Uranium enrichment plants and plutonium recovery plants are necessary to
produce HEU and Pu. The IAEA should make more efforts to enhance the safe-
guards approach to detect not only the diversion of HEU and Pu but also the
clandestine facilities to be used for the production of undeclared HEU and Pu.
(2) Progress Beyond the Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
We can recognize that the NPT has different obligations between NWSs and
NNWSs. Now, after the end of the Gold War, the international community is
strongly awakened to the necessities of further progress in disarmament and non-
proliferation. These intentions require the establishment of a new practical regime
such as the CTBT and a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) to prevent the
development of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted in 1996 at the General Assembly of the United Nations,
and now the Parties are making efforts to enter it into force. The adoption of
the CTBT is highly appreciated by the international community for nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament.
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On the other hand, though the discussion of a FMCT was agreed to start imme-
diately at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, unfortunately, the discussion
has not yet begun. The international community, hereafter, should make more ef-
fort to obtain agreement for the Treaty without discrimination between NWSs and
NNWSs.
(3) Nuclear Weapon Free Zones coupled with International Verification
The NPT states that nothing in the Treaty affects the right to establish NWFZ
in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the te汀itories. Since
the NWFZ may have a very useful function linked directly with maintaining re-
gional security, it is important that any treaty for the establishment of a NWFZ
should be concluded for the common benefits among也e States within it. It is a
matter of course that an international verification regime related to the IAEA
should be introduced to increase the transparency of nuclear activities within the
NWFZ States.
(4) Progress in Nuclear Disarmament and Verification
The disarmament direction demonstrated by仇e conclusion of the START I and
II Treaties between the U.S. and Russia is welcomed by the international commu-
nity, however the current disarmament has only aimed at the nuclear weapons
which no longer have a strategic purpose. The states have not agreed to reduce
the others, such as currently deployed nuclear weapons. From也e fundamental
concept that disarmament should be accomplished in order to prevent devastation
by a nuclear war, it is more desirable to progress it也an remain at the present
stage through the review of nuclear strategy.
On the other hand, we can notice也e important fact that progress in nuclear
disarmament may possibly cause the proliferation of dangerous material. There-
fore, the most dangerous nuclear materials, as well as warheads or pits, should be
reduced in stages, and dismantled weapons should be strictly controlled.
4. New Roles of the IAEA
Basic functions of the IAEA are prescribed in the Statute. Generally, such func-
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tions could be categorized into two kinds of tasks. One is the promotion and sup-
port of peaceful nuclear activities in the Member States, and the o也er is the de-
signing and applying of safeguards. The activities of promotion involve any op-
eration or service useful in research on, or development or practical application of,
atomic energy for peaceful purposes. As for the safeguards, special fissionable
and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available
by the IAEA as well as any of the state's activities in the field of atomic energy,
which are required by the Parties to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement or
a State, are subjected.
In order to focus our discussion, we suggest the following new roles related to
verification activities.
(1) Strengthened Safeguards for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities
The IAEA must develop a new system to confirm the absence of undeclared ma-
terial and activities which can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. In par-
ticular, the IAEA should establish a new method for the confirmation of the end
location of equipment which could be used directly for the nuclear weapons, as
well as its end use. The equipment may be exported from other states or pro-
duced within its own facilities. The information regarding the equipment is to be
provided by the Member States according to血e provision of也e information de-
scribed in the Protocol to the safeguards agreement, in addition to the current
safeguards regime. The regime should be applied to facilities under less discrimi-
natory conditions. These applications can offer some assurance for the prevention
of nuclear proliferation to the international community.
As almost the same equipment has been defined in INFCIRC/254 as a guideline
for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology among the suppliers
group, if the IAEA will establish the new scheme routinely, the confidence level of
non-proliferation will increase.
(2) Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Activities in the Member States
It is true that considerable efforts by the Member States are essential for
achieving nuclear non-proliferation. In order to increase the effectiveness of the
efforts by the Member States, the verification activities by the IAEA are also es-
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sential.
The verification in the NWFZs is a very important activity to contribute to the
confidence building within the States of the Zone. However, not all States in the
NWFZs agree with the NPT, and currently the IAEA has not executed the com-
prehensive verification activities to the States equally. Therefore, the IAEA
should apply the comprehensive safeguards to the NWFZ States. The objective
conclusions reached by the IAEA may increase the confidence levels between such
States, even if they have already established a mutual inspection scheme.
Some Governments holding plutonium for peaceful nuclear activities are making
efforts to set out guidelines to manage it. The IAEA should positively support
their activities.
The Physical Protection System should be established under the states'and faciL
Ity operators'responsibilities. Taking into account the threat level to be assumed
based upon the surrounding of each state and也e international recommendation de-
scribed in connection with the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the states
should make a suitable prescript or guideline for the Physical Protection System,
which should be constructed by the operator. The IAEA should make efforts to
establish some appropriate and sufficient evaluation procedures of the Physical
Protection System developed by each state, from the point of view of the function
to protect nuclear material from individual threats.
(3) Verification of Nuclear Materials released from Nuclear Weapons, and a
Control System for Dismantled Materials
It can be easily foreseen that a large amount of nuclear material from disarmed
and dismantled weapons will increase in connection with the progress of the
START process. The possibility that也ese materials may flow into other prolifera-
tion streams, is concerned by the international community.
The IAEA Board recognized in March 1997 that when the Model Protocol enters
into force, the international community will obtain a more credible assurance not
only of the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials from declared activities but
also of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and facilities within NNWSs
party to the NPT. As NNWSs made efforts to accept complementary activities
according to the Protocol, NWSs should make best efforts to establish an addi-
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tional regime to prevent nuclear proliferation.
To build confidence for preventing the retrieval of dismantled nuclear material,
the U.S. and Russia should request the establishment of a suitable international
verification regime by the IAEA. Although to control such nuclear materials with
sensitive information on nuclear weapons is not subjected to international venfica-
tion, the IAEA should establish a practical system and measures to be applied to
nuclear materials such as fissile materials, as well as pits from warheads no
longer needed, in order to ensure the elimination of such materials under the
agreed conditions of the START Treaties.
Regarding prevention of illicit trafficking, it was agreed at the Denver Summit
in June 1997, that some activities concerned with prevention of nuclear smuggling
should be immediately taken as a preliminary step. From the above agreeme鴫it
is necessary to establish a new effective international monitoring system that could
prevent nuclear proliferation through smuggling or illicit trafficking of nuclear ma-
terials, especially, nuclear weapon-usable materials and nuclear weapons.
The expected roles and functions of也e IAEA may be almost like the functions
of the International Criminal Police Organization: systematic investigation, data re-
cording, provision of information to也e Member States and coordination of infor-
mation exchange between血e Member States. We recognize也at the IAEA has
partially started to search for information about illicitly trafficked nuclear maten-
als and other radioactive substances, but the Member States should give a new
mandate to the IAEA to expand the subjects such as the specified equipment used
for making a nuclear weapon.
(4) Participation in Verification of Nuclear Disarmament Treaties
As for a FMCT, verification activities should be submitted to the IAEA by the
parties of the treaty, because the IAEA's technology for measurement and surveiト
Iance is useful for the establishment of a verification regime. In addition, the
IAEA should contribute to make up a control and verification system for仙e dis-
assembling of missiles through an agreement beyond the present START Treaties.
The international community pays attention to the reduction of nuclear weapons
under secure conditions.
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(5) Development of Proliferation-Resistant Technology
In order to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the IAEA should pr0-
mote the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. We deem that the
time has come to consider the non-proliferation function of nuclear technology
from the beginning of development and facility design. The IAEA should promote
and support the activities of industries in the Member States and should spread
the results to the world in order to reduce仇e possibility of nuclear material,
equipment and technology being used for weapons.
5. Technical Issues related to the New Verification Activities
The current safeguards in accordance with INFCIRC/153, have been developed
and applied so as to meet a basic concept to assure that all nuclear material in
peaceful use activities in　也e territory of the states is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In order to achieve the above con-
cept, material accountancy and containment surveillance are developed and strictly
adopted to verify in a quantitative manner the validity of declarations by the
Member States party to the NPT.
However, the verification results from Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
showed the need to develop new safeguards measures, taking into account the de-
tection capability against undeclared materials and activities, including clandestine
facilities. This requirement could be achieved by introducing new approaches cou-
pled with the current ways to verify all possibilities related to making nuclear
weapons .
We recognize that it may be very difficult to meet with such a requirement, be-
cause the approaches should be executed under circumstances where there are sus-
picions of non-compliance. But we can suggest a procedure which may be helpful
to develop such approaches.
(1) Proliferation Oriented Approach
This approach may be constructed with the following three parts:
a. Identification of Proliferation Scenarios
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b. Collection and accumulation of the information used for analysis to search for
the possible proliferation events
c. Information analysis and resolution of inconsistencies including requirements of
additional information from the States concerned and executions of the comple-
mentary access
a.  Identification of Proliferation Scenarios
We can identify that the most critical events related to proliferation are as foト
Iows;
- Undeclared production of HEU
- Undeclared production(irradiation) of Pu
- Undeclared recovery of Pu
- Illicit trafficking of material released from warhead
The first three events consist of two different scenarios; construction of the un-
declared facility and misuse of a declared facility. The events related to the mis-
use scenario can be detected by continuous design information verification or other
measures which could increase transparency of plant operation.
we recommend to establish a system for confirmation of the end location of
equipment possible to use for the undeclared production and recovery of HEU and
Pu.
b.　Collection and accumulation of the information used for analysis to search for the pos-
sible proliferation events
The sort of information to be used for analysis to search for the undeclared ac-
tivities are shown in Article 2 0f the Protocol additional to the safeguards agree-
ment according to INFCIRC/153. Especially, information of the scale of opera-
tions for each location engaged in也e activities concerned with productions in the
States and imports from the suppliers regarding the specified equipment are very
useful to confirm the end use of such equipment. The IAEA should make a de-
tailed format for a submission of this information from the Member States. In or-
der to increase the transparency of也e nuclear activities, the Member States have
to offer this information to the IAEA according to the Protocol and the format.
The submitted information would be categorized systematically and accumulated
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in a computer by a suitable database system.
c. Information analysis and resolution of the inconsistencies including requirement of addi-
tional information from the States concerned and execution of the complementary access
It can be generally considered that the viewpoint of information analysis and
resolution is to confirm inconsistencies between programs and actualities of nuclear
activities, such as the export information provided by the supplier or the product
information wi仇in the Member States of the specified equipment, and the end lo-
cation as well as the end use.
The IAEA should construct a methodology to be used for the analysis and reso-
lution of the inconsistencies step by step. The proposed procedures to be intro-
duced for the information analysis and resolution are as follows:
Step 1 : Identification of the inconsistencies in也e provided information
Step 2 : Recognition and evaluation of magnitudes of the inconsistencies
Step 3 : Follow-up actions including a requirement to provide additional informa-
tion or clarification.
Step 4 : Additional evaluation to resolve the inconsistencies including an execution
of也e complementary access
(2) Integrated verification system
The IAEA should integrate the current safeguards approach and the proliferation
oriented approach. The former is for the detection of any diversion of 1 Signifi-
cant Quantity from declared material in a timely manner and the latter is for
seeking to obtain the high assurance level for the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in any nuclear peaceful use.
Theoretically, if we can achieve such high assurance level, the results obtained
from the proliferation oriented approach could positively influence the current safe-
guards approach. When the IAEA can reject the possibility of the existence of an
undeclared uranium enrichment facility, depending upon the assurance level, ura-
mum can then be considered as a material which is not possible to divert, and
only treated as a fuel for nuclear energy. The same proposal could be suggested
for the treatment of the spent fuel.
If the proliferation oriented approach could be put into practice, the IAEA could
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improve the current safeguards approach efficiently, to reduce the efforts to be ex-
pended for them under conditions which shall keep or maintainthe effectiveness of
the current level.
6. Conclusion
As we discussed the new roles for the international verification of the IAEA
mentioned above, several proposals and issues could be pointed out. The interna-
tional community should expect the IAEA to gain new roles and functions in con-
nection withthe change of the times, and receive the benefit from the activities of
the IAEA. The end of the Cold War brought enormous change tothe problems in
the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The roles and functions of the IAEA should
be improved in accordance with the expectations from the international community.
